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PRELIMINARY MEl-10RANDUM 
October 31, 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 80-5303 
ANTONIA BELTRAN ET AL 
v 
BEVERLEE MYERS (DIRECTOR, 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTt1ENT 
OF HEALTH) ET AL 
Cert to CA9 (Wright, Anderson 
and Solomon [DJ]) 
Federal/Civil · Timely 
SUMMARY: This class action challenges the validity under 
federal law of California's "transfer-of-assets" rule governing 
eligibility fot l-tedi.-Cal benefits. It is str!foght-lined with 
Barbara Blum v Ethel Caldwell, 179-2034, which involves the New 
York "tranofet-of-asceta" rule. 
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FACTS: Title XIX of the Social Security Act established 
the Medicaid program, a cooperative federal-state program to 
provide medical assistance to certain classes of people who are 
in need of assistance. Though the states are not required to 
participate, if they choose to do so they must develop a plan 
that conforms to federal guidelines. Despite extensive federal 
standards, 42 u.s.c. S 1396a, the individual states are given 
wide discretion in the administration of local programs. The 
states may decide whether or not to aid all ' "medically needy" 
individuals. But participating states ~ provide assistance 
to •categorically needy" individuals -- that is, persons now 
receiving (or eligible to receive) certain enumerated kinds of 
assistance (such as AFDC). 
Tbe chief distinction between the •medically needy" and the 
•categorically needy• categories is that persons in the latter 
category have generally lower incomes. This is not to say that 
aa.e states do not build an economic factor into the standards 
for determing who is •medically needy.• California, for one, 
li•its the assets owned by a medically needy individual. As 
part of this scheme, the legislature adopted the "transfer of 
asaeta• (TOA) rule. This rule can operate to prevent a person 
fro. qualifying aa •medically needy• if, in order to qual·ify 
for aid under tbe relevant financial eligibility rules, he baa 
tranaferred ••••t• for 1••• than fair con•l4erat1oo wltbln tbe 
t.o rear• prior to bl• application. 
ub 
tbe toA~ex .. pt• ~• a• .. t• froa tbe llaltatlon • b~• aDI 
' iaoo.e-producint real property, for ex .. ple. lut 'blt • 
/ 
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property remains subject to a recovery provision. That is, 
v after the person dies, California may recover the cost of aid 
provided from the estate (including exempt assets). 
What makes the TOA rule especially interesting is that 
under federal law a person remains eligible for SSI payments 
even if he has become eligible by transferring assets to others 
!for less than adequate consideration. Thus, California must 
allow transfers by the "categorically needy," but it does not 
allow transfers by the "medically needy." 
The petitioners in this class action were "medically needy" 
and otherwise eligible for benefits, but were denied benefits 
because they had transferred assets for less than fair value 
prior to applying for aid. They were not able to overcome the 
wrebuttable" presumption the TOA erects in such cases. They 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating and/or 
enjoining the use of the TOA rule. The district court granted 
a motion for summary judgment in favor of California. It also 
entered findings of fact that the TOA rule did not conflict with 
federal regulations. 
HOLDING BELOW: While recognizing that "the majority of the 
courts which have been faced with similar challenges have 
reached the opposite conclusion," CA9 upheld California's TOA 
rule. 
The court began by asking whether the California rule was 
consistent with federal law. 42 U.S.C. S 1396a (a) (10) (C), as 
·administratively interpreted, permits the transfer of assets 
for less than adequate consideration in order to become eligible 
for SSI benefits. But the provisions defining the •medically 
needy• do not extend all of the SSI eligibility requirements to 
the •medically needy" classification. If they did, there would 
be no difference between the two classifications, •medically 
needy• and •categorically needy.• Insofar as the statute 
requires analogous standards for the two classifications (as it 
does), it requires comparable,~ identical, factors. This 
means only that there must be enough similar characteristics or 
qualities to make comparison appropriate. California's rules 
aeet that teat. 
The court next turned to 42 u.s.c. S 1396a (a) (17) (B), which 
requires that, in determining eligibility, states only consider 
inca.e and resources which are •available• to the applicant. CA 
refused to take an •overly rigid and literal• reading of the 
word •available.• The court emphasized the ovecall approach of 
the statute's eligibility provisions was one of flexiblity. The 
California rule presumes that the asset is •available• in some 
way to the applicant, even after he baa given it away. That is 
not an unreasonable approach. 
!b1e brought the court to 42 C.F.R. s 435.401, which says 
tbat ' •"~• ~ not uae criteria for deteralning eli9lbilty in 
... ~ "~,.~c~l;lr Aeed • Gl•••lf~c~101l ac• .ore stringent 
• t 
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au .. th r~ulatlon co..s ln the 
ulr ... nta• aectl n of the rules, not ln 
tl dealing with financial factors. 
tu~ned the constitutional challen9ea to the 
~--~ only a rebuttable preau.ptlon, and 
e table ana.~ the Due Process Clause. And, it 
sed CODg~eaa, after all, differentiated between 
aaslficatloas , and hence it ia acceptable under the 
-·- Pro~! Claaae. 
!;!!!!!~~!!!= fte petl tloner reiterates t:he arga~~ents e 
.-de before CAJ. notes that states cannot penalize otherwise 
eligible SSI applu:ants for tranaferriDCJ assets. '1'0 per•it thea 
peeaJ iae tbase tlbo are otherwise •.e«Jical.ly neec1y• la to 
ra-tzab! tbe statab!, becaaae tbe statute iacJicat:es that: a 
state -.y ~ ~Y to tbe -.edically DeecJy• CE lt:eria .ore 
aac:.ae used to judge t:be •categcK lcally needy. • 
fte c.1y psatsslble dlffereace beble• the two categories l s 
tile J,elter Is jllllged by .ore liberal reaouce CODC1itlOilS. 
Be El f ~ dille rea.a1 ageDCJ' bas l.Dforaea state lledicaid 
~Jat:ICIIWtip beweea t1ae -.aUcaJJy aeecJy• 
ta~•· atat:ell 1110t apply 
- 6 -
~ Pinally, the petitioner reasserts -M1!r Equal Protection 
arguaent by saying that the TOA rule irrationally differentiates 
between the •medically needy• and the •categorically needy.• 
~e respondent claims that the TOA rule is not designed to 
penalize individuals, but rather to preserve state funds for the 
truly needy. This comports with the purpose of the federal law 
and with the decisions of this Court. No contrary federal 
statutes or regulations exist. There is no prohibition of TOA 
rules in Title XIX, and the only reasonable reading of that 
statute would allow different treatment of the two categories 
of recipients. Since the courts should not presume that the 
Congress intended to preempt the exercise of a valid state power 
unless the Congress bas clearly and unambiguously expressed that 
intent, the courts should not circumscribe California's exercise 
of power here. 
On all other issues, tbe respondent tracks the opinion of 
CAt in tbis case. 
DISCDSSIOlla 'l'bere is a stark conflict among the circuits 
as to the interpretation of this ~portant statute. Caldwell 
Y Bla!, •21 F2d 491 (CA2)J Pabula v Buck, 598 P24 869 (CA4). 
,_~ ce .. ba8 been et~aight-lined witb CA2'a opinion on the 
.. # v 911 ... 11, 179-2031 lbla la the ...-~lo~ caae 
a l:h&l ,u.._ 
a 
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persuasive. ~A9 properly found that the presumption created was 
rebuttable and that the differentiation was built into the 
statute itself. 
I reco~~end a grant on the statutory question. 1 would not 
grant on the petitioner's second question . 
There is a response. 
9/ 9/ 80 Sexton Opinion in Petition 
